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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the election model in which voters can select any
subset from the set of candidates. Examples are where the members of
a club select new comers, or where the executive committee of a society
select new members. Barberµa et al. (1991) ¯rst study this model under
the assumption that voters possess preferences with separable strict order-
ings over the power set of the sets of candidates. In this paper, we extend
their model so that not only voters but candidates have preferences and the
actual running candidates is variable, and we investigate a rule satisfying
\candidate stability". Candidate stability requires that for any candidate,
standing in the election with any set of running candidates is at least as de-
sirable as withdrawing from it. Dutta et al. (2001) suggests the importance
of this property as a basis of the study for any election model. If an election
rule satis¯es candidate stability, all candidates may stand in the election. If
an election rule does not satisfy candidate stability, candidates' strategies
whether to run the election at the pre-election stage may a®ect the rule and
hence the rule designer has to take it into account.
Dutta et al. (2001) ¯rst study this property in the single-winner election
where preferences are unrestricted, and shows that a rule satisfying candi-
date stability and unanimity is only dictatorial.1 By comparison, our main
result is a possibility result. We show that a rule satis¯es candidate stability
if and only if it satis¯es the following independence condition. Suppose in
the election with some set of running candidates and some preference pro¯le
of voters, a candidate wins. Then she also should win in the election with
any set of running candidates she belongs to and any preference pro¯le that
is equivalent to the previous pro¯le in the comparison of herself and the null
outcome. This is a quite parallel work to Barberµa et al. (1991). They impose
strategy-proofness, which requires non-manipulability by voters, and derive
independence of the selection for each candidate as a part of voting by com-
mittees that they characterize. Meanwhile, we impose non-manipulability
of candidates and derive the similar independence condition.
Related literature includes Berga et al. (2004, 2006). They consider
similar models to ours in which voters are existing members of a society and
1We omit the descriptions of standard properties in Introduction. See them in the
original literature.
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have exit options. They study stability of the existing members while we
focus on the stability of candidates as new entrants. Literature on candi-
date stability includes Ehlers and Weymark (2003), Eraslan and McLennan
(2004), Rodr¶³guez-¶Alvarez (2005, 2006), and Samejima (2005, 2007).
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 states the
model and the main result. Section 3 gives a short discussion and conclusion.
The appendix includes the proof of the main result.
2 The model and the result
Let C ´ f1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; cg be the set of (prospective) candidates with c ¸ 1.
We refer to a candidate who actually stands on the election as a running
candidate. Let V ´ fc + 1; c + 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; c + vg be the set of voters with
v ¸ 1. For simplicity, we assume C \ V = Â. For a voter or a candidate
i 2 C [ V , let Pi denote her preference, which is a complete, transitive,
and asymmetric binary relation over 2C . We assume that any preference Pi
satis¯es the following restrictions.
Separability: For all i 2 C [ V , all x 2 C, and all Y µ Cnfxg, we have
Y [ fxg Pi Y () fxg Pi Â.
Additivity: Pi has an additive numerical representation.2
We refer to a preference satisfying separability and additivity as an ad-
ditively separable preference. Let DS denote the domain of all such pref-
erences. All preferences of voters are assumed to be in the domain DS .
In addition to additive separability, we impose another restriction on the
preferences of the candidates: for all x 2 C, fxg Px Â. Since without it, the
concept of \candidate stability" is not meaningful, we refer to it as themin-
imal restriction for candidates' preferences. Let DM denote the domain of
all additively separable preferences satisfying the restriction. A preference
pro¯le is a c + v tuple of preferences P = (P1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Pc; Pc+1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Pc+v) 2
DcM £DvS . Let i; j 2 C [V . Let (P 0i ; P¡i) 2 DcM £DvS denote the preference
pro¯le obtained from P by replacing Pi with P 0i , (P
00
j ; P
0
i ; Pf¡i;jg) 2 DcM£DvS
denote the pro¯le obtained from (P 0i ; P¡i) by replacing Pj with P
00
j , and so
on. Let PijX denote the preference relation over X µ C induced by Pi 2 DS .
2Separability and additivity are independent in our de¯nition. See Barberµa et al.
(1991) and Berga et al. (2004) for examples of that separability does not imply additivity.
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Similarly, let P jX denote the preference pro¯le over X µ C induced by
P 2 DcM £DvS .
A rule is a function ' : 2C £ DcM £ DvS ! 2C . Following Dutta et
al. (2001), a rule ' is assumed to satisfy the following three properties.
First, winners should be chosen from the set of running candidates. Second,
only voters' preferences matter. Third, only preferences over the running
candidates matter.
Feasibility: For all X 2 2C and all P 2 DcM £DvS , we have '(X;P ) µ X.
Independence of nonvoters' preferences: For allX 2 2C and all P; P 0 2
DcM £DvS such that for all i 2 V , Pi = P 0i , we have '(X;P ) = '(X;P 0).
Independence of irrelevant alternatives: For allX 2 2C and all P; P 0 2
DcM £DvS such that P jX = P 0jX , we have '(X;P ) = '(X;P 0).
The formal de¯nition of \candidate stability" of a rule is given as follows.
Candidate stability: For all X 2 2CnfÂg, all x 2 X, and all P 2 DcM £
DvS , we have '(X;P ) Px '(Xnfxg; P ) or '(X;P ) = '(Xnfxg; P ).3
We claims that candidate stability is equivalent to the following inde-
pendence condition. Suppose that for some set of running candidates and
some preference pro¯le, a candidate wins. Then she also should win for any
set of running candidates she belongs to and any preference pro¯le that is
equivalent to the previous pro¯le in the comparison of herself and the null
outcome.
Independence: For all X;Y 2 2CnfÂg, all x 2 C such that x 2 X and
x 2 Y , and all P; P 0 2 DcM £DvS such that P jffxg;Âg = P 0jffxg;Âg, we have
x 2 '(X;P ) () x 2 '(Y; P 0).
Proposition 1. A rule satis¯es candidate stability if and only if it satis¯es
independence.4
Proof of Proposition 1. See the appendix.
3The original de¯nition of candidate stability in Dutta et al. (2001) is slightly weaker
than ours in the sense that they consider stability only when running candidates equal
candidates (i.e., X = C). Our de¯nition of candidate stability is similar to \no-exit
stability" in Samejima's (2007) model with single-peaked preference domain.
4Ju (2003) extends Barberµa et al.'s (1991) model to allow indi®erences of voters' pref-
erences. This proposition holds even in Ju's (2003) model. The proof is the same.
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The intuition behind the proof is as follows. Since we impose the mini-
mal restriction on candidate preferences, there exists a candidate who prefers
another candidate to win no matter whether the other candidates, including
herself, are elected. There also exists a candidate who prefers another can-
didate not to win no matter whether the other candidates, including herself,
are elected. If independence is violated, a candidate with such a preference
may be better o® by not running. This violates candidate stability.
3 Discussion and concluding remarks
Before concluding this paper, we note that if we drop the minimal restriction
for candidates' preferences and impose a stronger but natural restriction for
them, Proposition 1 fails. Let D¤M ( DM be the domain of all additively
separable preferences satisfying the following restriction for candidates. For
all x 2 C and all Px 2 D¤S , fxg Px Â and for all y 2 Cnfxg, fxg Px fyg. This
states that any candidate prefers herself to any other candidate. A counter
example to the equivalent statement of Proposition 1 in this domain is the
following.
Example 1. Let C ´ f1; 2g and V ´ f3g. Let ' be a rule such that
(i) for any P 2 D¤2M £DS , 1 2 '(C;P3) and 1 2 '(f1g; P ),
(ii) if f1g P3 Â, 2 2 '(C;P ) and if Â P3 f1g, 2 62 '(C;P ), and
(iii) for any P 2 D¤2M £DS , 2 2 '(f2g; P ).
Then ' satis¯es candidate stability, however, it does not satisfy indepen-
dence.
The question how candidate stability works on the domain D¤S is open.
We hope that this paper will help further research on candidate stability.
Appendix
Before proving Proposition 1, we introduce one property and three lemmas.
The next property is taken from Eraslan and McLennan (2004).
Strong candidate stability: For all X 2 2CnfÂg, all x 2 X and all
P 2 DcM £DvS , we have '(X;P )nfxg = '(Xnfxg; P ).5
5The de¯nition of strong candidate stability in Eraslan and McLennan (2004) is slightly
di®erent from ours since their model does not allow the outcome of empty set.
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Lemma 1. A rule satis¯es candidate stability if and only if it satis¯es strong
candidate stability.
Proof of Lemma 1. Since the if part of proposition is obvious, we only show
the only if part.
Note that strong candidate stability is equivalent to the requirement that
for all X 2 2CnfÂg, all x 2 X, and all P 2 DcM £DvS , (i) '(X;P )nfxg µ
'(Xnfxg; P ) and (ii) '(Xnfxg; P ) µ '(X;P )nfxg. At ¯rst, suppose, on
the contrary, that ' satis¯es candidate stability but not (i). Then there
exist X 2 2CnfÂg, x 2 X, and P 2 DcM £ DvS such that '(Xnfxg; X) (
'(X;P )nfxg. Let y 2 '(X;P )n(fxg['(Xnfxg; P )). Let P 0x 2 DM be such
that for all Y;Z µ X with y 2 Y and y 62 Z, Z P 0x Y . Then '(Xnfxg; P ) P 0x
'(X;P ). By independence of nonvoters' preferences, '(Xnfxg; P 0x; P¡x) P 0x
'(X;P 0x; P¡x). This contradicts candidate stability. Hence our supposition
is incorrect.
Next, suppose, on the contrary, that ' satis¯es candidate stability but
not (ii). Then there exist X 2 2CnfÂg, x 2 X, and P 2 DcM £ DvS such
that '(X;P )nfxg ( '(Xnfxg; P ). Let y 2 '(Xnfxg; P ))n'(X;P ). Let
P 0x 2 DM be such that for all Y;Z µ X with y 2 Y and y 62 Z, Y P 0x Z.
Then '(Xnfxg; P ) P 0x '(X;P ). By independence of nonvoters' preferences,
'(Xnfxg; P 0x; P¡x) P 0x '(X;P 0x; P¡x). This contradicts candidate stability.
Hence our supposition is incorrect.
Lemma 2. If a rule ' satis¯es candidate stability, then for all X 2 2C with
jXj ¸ 2, all x; y 2 X and all P 2 DcM £DvS , we have x 2 '(X;P ) () x 2
'(Xnfyg; P ).
Proof of Lemma 2. This is direct from Lemma 1.
Lemma 3. If ' satis¯es candidate stability, then for all X 2 2C with
jXj ¸ 2, all x 2 X, all P 2 DcM £ DvS , all i 2 V and all P 0i 2 DS such
that for a candidate y 2 Xnfxg, Pijffyg;Âg 6= P 0i jffyg;Âg and for all other
candidates z 2 Xnfyg, Pijffzg;Âg = P 0i jffzg;Âg, we have x 2 '(X;P ) ()
x 2 '(X;P 0i ; P¡i).
Proof of Lemma 3. Let ' be a rule satisfying candidate stability. Let X 2
2C , x 2 X, P 2 DcM £ DvS , i 2 V and P 0i 2 DS sa¯sfy the hypothe-
sis of Lemma 3. Suppose, on the contrary, that x 2 '(X;P ) but x 62
'(X;P 0i ; P¡i). By strong candidate stability, '(X;P )nfyg = '(Xnfyg; P )
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and '(X;P 0i ; P¡i)nfyg = '(Xnfyg; P 0i ; P¡i). Thus, x 2 '(Xnfyg; P ) and
x 62 '(Xnfyg; P 0i ; P¡i). However, by independence of irrelevant alternatives,
'(Xnfyg; P ) = '(Xnfyg; P 0i ; P¡i). Thus, x 2 '(Xnfyg; P 0i ; P¡i). It is a
contradiction. Hence our supposition is incorrect.
Proof of Proposition 1. The only if part: By the iterated use of Lemma 2 on
candidates and Lemma 3 on preference pro¯les, independence is obtained.
The if part: Let X 2 2CnfÂg, x 2 X and P 2 DcM £ DvS . For all
y 2 '(X;P )nfxg, independence implies y 2 '(Xnfxg; P ). Also for all z 62
'(X;P )nfxg, independence implies z 62 '(Xnfxg; P ). Thus '(Xnfxg; P ) =
'(X;P )nfxg and ' satis¯es strong candidate stability. Hence, it satis¯es
candidate stability.
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